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Abstract
A skill-biased change in technology can account at once for the changes observed
in a number of important variables of the US labour market between 1970 and
1990. These include the increasing inequality in wages, both between and within
education groups, and the increase in unemployment at all levels of education. In
contrast, in previous literature this type of technology shock cannot account for
all of these changes. The paper uses a matching model with a segmented labour
market, an imperfect correlation between individual ability and education, and a
ﬁxed cost of setting up a job. The endogenous increase in overeducation is key to
understand the response of unemployment to the technology shock.
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1 Introduction
In the U.S., between 1970 and 1990, unemployment rates for both high-school
graduates and college graduates nearly doubled, the wage diﬀerential (or pre-
mium) between these two education groups widened considerably, and residual
wage inequality within the two groups also rose. Table 1 reports ﬁgures on the
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19 July 2007ﬁrst three variables for the male population in 1970 and 1990. 1 Juhn et al
(1993) and Lemieux (2004), among others, have documented document the
typical upward shifts of residual inequality within the high-school and college
groups. 2 The period 1970-1990 is also one where there are clear indications
of a rise in the fraction of college graduates that take non-graduate jobs, a
phenomenon known as overeducation. Pryor and Schaﬀer (1997) and Wolﬀ
(2000) supply compelling evidence that since 1971 university graduates have
increasingly been taking jobs in which the average educational level is much
lower. 3
Table 1. U.S. labour market 1970-1990
college high-school
year unemployment rate unemployment rate wage premium
1970 1.1 2.4 1.44
1990 2.1 5.3 1.58
A skill-biased change in technology (hereafter also a SBTC) is commonly
regarded as the primary explanation for the widening dispersion of wages.
This paper’s central point is that the same SBTC which drives wage disper-
sion may also imply a surge in overeducation that helps explain much of the
observed changes in unemployment. This contrasts favourably with existing
studies where a SBTC cannot account simultaneously for a rise in educated
unemployment, a widening in wage dispersion – both across and within edu-
cation groups – and an upward shift in the degree of overeducation.
In order to articulate this point, the model in our previous work Cuadras-
Morat´ o and Mateos-Planas (2006) (henceforth CMMP) is adapted so that
the analysis can account for the phenomenon of over-education. Like CMMP,
this paper uses a search-matching model of a labour market that is segmented
into two education levels. Segmentation means that both vacant ﬁrms and un-
employed workers conﬁne their search eﬀorts to the particular segment they
choose, not to both. Workers are diﬀerentiated by skill (or ability) and educa-
tion, with these two attributes being only imperfectly correlated. Therefore,
1 For unemployment, the ﬁgures are calculated from the Statistical Abstracts of the
US, US Census Bureau (1995), Table 662. The unemployment rates refer to male
civilian non-institutional population aged 25-64. The wage premium is the average
wage of college white male workers over the average wage for high-school white male
workers aged 18-64 as reported in Murphy and Welch (1992) for the years 1969 and
1989 (see also Katz and Murphy (1992) and Card and Di Nardo (2002)).
2 The sustained increase in overall residual inequality during this period has been
extensively documented and studied. See, for example, Krusell et al. (2000), Violante
(2002), and Heathcote el al. (2004).
3 However Acemoglu (1999), based on PSID survey responses, reports indications
of a slight fall in overeducation between 1976 and 1985.
2changes in workers’ career (or segment) choices may have implications for
equilibrium unemployment and wages across education groups. An educated
worker has to decide which of the two segments to participate in depending
on the employment and wage prospects associated with the two alternatives,
whereas a non-educated can only participate in the non-educated segment.
Firms decide which education segment to participate in, and which level of
skills to hire taking into account the skill composition of the labour force in
the diﬀerent segments. Workers and ﬁrms interact in this economy in an oth-
erwise standard framework with search and matching frictions to determine
wages and vacancy/unemployment ratios in the two segments.
In contrast with CMMP, the present paper introduces a positive ﬁxed start-
up cost of creating a job. This proves to be a key feature for overeducation
to arise as a result of the career decisions made by certain educated workers.
An educated worker may turn to the non-educated segment and thus become
overeducated when her chances of employment in the educated segment be-
come slim. This can happen to educated yet low skilled individuals when, due
to the existence of the ﬁxed cost, educated ﬁrms refuse to hire them.
The speciﬁc objective of this paper is to use this model to study, both qualita-
tively and quantitatively, the ability of a skill-biased change in technology to
account for the observed diﬀerences in wage inequality and unemployment con-
ditions between 1970 and 1990. Moreover, it seeks an interpretation for the well
known observed decline in the college premium during the early sub-period
1970-1980 – a time when college attainment in the labour force was growing
very rapidly. The model is analysed to establish some of its basic properties
and draw possible implications of a SBTC and changes in the composition of
skills in the labour force for the observable variables. Numerical exercises are
then conducted to study these eﬀects quantitatively. The benchmark parame-
ters are set to match some long-run observations for the US economy and the
1970 values of key endogenous variables. In the main exercise, the exogenous
SBTC shock is measured to match the observed changes in the wage premium
between 1970 and 1990. In another exercise, the SBTC shock is accompanied
by a decline in the skill composition of the educated labour force. These two
sets of shocks are then used to produce steady-state equilibrium outcomes for
the entire range of labour market variables of interest which are to be com-
pared, respectively, with the 1970-1990 and 1970-1980 facts reported above.
In order to gain further quantitative insight, a shock to the general employ-
ment conditions in the form of a shift in matching technology will also be
considered.
The ﬁndings are as follows. A SBTC may lead to a situation where ﬁrms look-
ing for educated workers will not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to hire low-productivity
individuals who will, consequently, turn to seek employment in the segment
of ﬁrms that do not require qualiﬁed workers. This overeducation then causes
3higher unemployment within the educated group since the fraction of overedu-
cated workers are subject to the tougher high-unemployment conditions of the
non-educated segment. This can also be consistent with a higher unemploy-
ment rate for the non-educated workers and widening wage dispersion across
and within education groups. The quantitative exercises demonstrate that the
SBTC can account for most of the changes in the wage premium and the edu-
cated unemployment rate between 1970 and 1990, and most of the rise in the
non-educated unemployment rate. Moreover, this is also qualitatively in ac-
cord with the observed upward shift in overeducation and residual inequality.
As for the fall in the wage premium during the earlier subperiod 1970-1980, a
SBTC still remains a very plausible explanation for the rising unemployment
rates if accompanied by an empirically defensible temporary decline in the
proportion of skilled workers within the educated group. The marked growth
in the numbers of college graduates and the direct evidence on ability scores
lend support to this hypothesis. This stands in contrast with the more common
explanations based on a deterioration of the general employment conditions.
It is worth emphasising that these conclusions crucially rest on the speciﬁc
assumptions made in the present paper that set it apart from the previous
model in CMMP. That paper does not consider the existence of start-up costs
and, as a consequence, overeducation is ruled out and an exogenous shock
to the employment conditions, in addition to a SBTC, becomes indispens-
able to explain a rise in the unemployment rate of the educated labor force.
The evidence on these shocks to employment conditions remains controver-
sial though. 4 Instead, in the present paper a SBTC, a widely acknowledged
phenomenon during the period, is suﬃcient to cause on its own most of the
observed changes in all the variables because of the response of overeduca-
tion. 5
Other papers have also studied the implications of a SBTC for dimensions of
wage inequality and unemployment in a search-matching setup. This litera-
ture includes Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), Acemoglu (1999), Albrecht and
Vroman (2002), Shi (2002), Dolado et al. (2003), Wong (2003), and Moore and
Rajan (2005). The diﬀerences in results and approach between the present and
these papers can be outlined as follows. Regarding the results, in the present
paper a SBTC causes rises in unemployment rates and residual inequality
within the two education groups, a higher wage premium, and a higher de-
gree of overeducation. In these other papers, a SBTC fails in at least two
4 Blanchard and Diamond (1989) and Bleakey and Furhrer (1997) discuss the em-
pirical relevance of changes in the eﬃciency of the matching process.
5 Also, CMMP endogenises the distribution of skill and education in the labour
force through the individual choices of education. Although changes in education
there play a central role in explaining the wage premium and the unemployment
rates, they have counterfactual implications for a variable which will be of interest
in the present paper, residual inequality.
4of these dimensions. Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) cannot explain rising
skilled unemployment and, by design, says nothing about overeducation or
residual inequality within education groups. Acemoglu (1999) fails to explain
rising residual inequality in any group and Albrecht and Vronan (2002) fails
in the unskilled group. In Dolado et al. (2003), which introduces on-the-job
search, the unemployment rate of the educated falls rather than rises. These
three papers imply a reduction of overeducation (or mismatch) rather than
an increase. In the present paper, the reduction in mismatch is associated
with higher overeducation instead. In Shi (2002) residual inequality among
the skilled remains constant at zero and the unemployment rate of the edu-
cated declines. In Wong (2003) residual inequality and the unemployment rate
both decline. In Moore and Rajan (2005) wage inequality increases but un-
employment falls for the skilled and, under some conditions, for the unskilled
too. On the other hand, only Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), and Wong
(2003) share with the present paper a quantitative approach to evaluating the
implications of the theory. 6
These contrasting results between the present and the other papers cited can
be traced down to basic characteristics of the formal analysis. First, in the cur-
rent paper the assumed imperfect correlation between education and skill has
an important role. The previous papers treat education as equivalent to skill
instead. Second, and related to the previous point, the present model assumes
that the labour market is segmented in terms of jobs with diﬀerent observable
education requirements rather than skill requirements. Technically, there is a
matching function for each segment. However ﬁrms in the two segments have
the same production technology. The assumption in Mortensen and Pissarides
(1999) is similar but, there, each diﬀerent segment is perfectly associated with
each of the (many) observable productivity-skill levels. In Acemoglu (1999)
there is no segmentation in the sense of the present paper, so education is
not used to sort applicants into job categories through diﬀerentiated match-
ing processes. 7 This is also true of Albrecht and Vroman (2002), Dolado et
al.(2003), and Wong (2003) where there are however two types of ﬁrms with
diﬀerent technologies of production. Two types of ﬁrms are also assumed in Shi
(2002) but that is a model of directed search where the endogenous matching
process leads to a segmentation similar to that in the present paper. Third, in
6 In Acemoglu (1999), there are no initial diﬀerences in unemployment between
education categories; in Albrecht and Vroman (2002) and Dolado et al. (2003) there
is residual inequality only among the skilled; in Shi (2002) there is residual inequality
only among the unskilled.
7 Therefore, in the equilibria studied in the present paper all ﬁrms within any of
the two segments will be of the same type. This rules out situations with two types
of ﬁrms catering for workers with diﬀerent skill level in the same segment, which
is precisely the type of situation that corresponds to a separating equilibrium in
Acemoglu (1999)’s model of a single-segment market. The present paper assumes
instead two segments and only considers pooling equilibria within each segment.
5the present paper a SBTC eﬀects a shift in the segment choice by educated
workers with diﬀerent skill characteristics which brings about key changes in
the skill composition of the labour supply in the diﬀerent segments. The sto-
ries in Acemoglu (1999), Albrecht and Vroman (2002), Dolado et al.(2003),
and Wong (2003) rest also on a shift in the pairing of workers’ skills and ﬁrms’
types but these cannot have such implications for the makeup of the labour
supply.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model
and basic behavior relations. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium. Section
4 discusses qualitatively some key comparative statics. Section 5 presents the
baseline calibration. Section 6 reports the results of the numerical analysis.
Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Model
There are two types of agents in the model, workers and ﬁrms. A worker’s type
is deﬁned by two characteristics: skill (indexed by j) and education (indexed
by i). A worker can be skilled (j = s) or non-skilled (j = ns), and educated
(i = e) or non-educated (i = ne). Workers can be either working for ﬁrm
or searching for a job. Firms can be either searching for a worker to ﬁll a
job vacancy or producing output with one worker. Workers and ﬁrms that
are searching meet through a matching process. Firms observe the education
status of a worker at any time but only observe her skill level after being
matched. It is assumed that a posted vacancy must be directed to workers of
a speciﬁc education group. More speciﬁcally, a ﬁrm targets either educated
or non-educated workers to ﬁll a vacancy, and its type is deﬁned accordingly,
educated or non-educated i ∈ {e,ne}. This implies that the labour market is
segmented by education requirements, with a matching process taking place
in each segment separately. A worker who does not hold proof of education
is prevented from searching in the educated segment. The rest of this section
describes the model and the decision problems faced by workers and ﬁrms.
Attention is restricted to stationary situations.
2.1 Workers
Workers in the labour force are distributed over the four types according to
a distribution whereby µ(j,i) denotes the fraction of workers with skill level
j ∈ {s,ns} and education i ∈ {e,ne}. Workers may leave the labour force with
a constant probability ρ. When a worker leaves, another worker of exactly the
6same type replaces her. This distribution is exogenous. 8
The timing of events for a worker is as follows. First, the worker enters the
labour force and decides which segment (or career) of the market, i ∈ {e,ne},
to participate in. A non-educated worker can only search for jobs in the non-
educated segment, while educated workers can search in either segment. Let
φj ∈ {0,1} represent the decision of an educated worker with skill j whether
to participate (value 1) or not in the educated segment, so 1 − φj is her
decision to participate in the non-educated segment. The given distribution of
the labour force over skill and education status and the career decisions will
jointly determine the skill composition of the labour force that participates in
each segment, pj|i: the proportion of workers in segment i ∈ {e,ne} with skill
j ∈ {s,ns}. An explicit expression for the distribution of skills within each
segment can be written as follows:
ps|e =
φsµ(s,e)
φsµ(s,e) + φnsµ(ns,e)
(1)
ps|ne =
µ(s,ne) + (1 − φs)µ(s,e)
µ(s,ne) + µ(ns,ne) + (1 − φns)µ(ns,e)
Second, the worker starts searching for a job. Workers and ﬁrms are matched
randomly. The probability that a worker searching in segment i makes contact
with a suitable ﬁrm is νi. The value to a worker with skill j seeking employment
in segment i is denoted by U(j,i). In a steady-state, the Bellman values are not
indexed by the worker’s education type because the worker, even if educated,
will never want to exercise the option to switch segment at a later date. Third,
after contacting a ﬁrm, the skill of the worker j is revealed and the worker
must agree with the ﬁrm on whether to create the job or continue searching.
The decision of the ﬁrm about hiring the worker is denoted by the indicator
πj|i ∈ {0,1}, with value 1 if the decision is positive. If the job is created, the
wage to the worker is w(j,i) and the value of the match is W(j,i). The job
is terminated exogeneously with a Poisson probability λ. If this happens, the
agent becomes unemployed and searches for a new job. There is a ﬂow value
to the unemployed worker that depends on the wage:
b(w(j,i)) = b0 + b1w(j,i) (2)
where b1 can be interpreted as the unemployment beneﬁt replacement rate,
and the ﬁxed component b0 may include the value of leisure.
The worker seeks to maximise the expected present value of utility. The in-
stantaneous utility is given by the value of consumption and the future is
8 In Cuadras-Morat´ o and Mateos-Planas (2006) it is an endogenous variable.
7discounted at the constant rate r. There is free borrowing and lending so in
equilibrium the interest rate equals r and the worker maximizes the present
value of wages plus unemployment compensation. The Bellman equation for
W(j,i) is
(r + ρ)W(j,i) = w(j,i) + λ(U(j,i) − W(j,i)). (3)
The value of unemployment for a worker with skill j in segment i is
(r + ρ)U(j,i) = b(w(j,i)) + νiπj|i max{W(j,i) − U(j,i),0}. (4)
As for career (or segment) choices, a non-educated worker can only search in
segment ne. The career choice by an educated worker can be represented by
φj =

 
 
1 U(j,e) − U(j,ne) > 0
0 otherwise
(5)
2.2 Firms
The timing of events is as follows. First, an inactive ﬁrm posts a job vacancy
that speciﬁes the education requirement on the worker sought (or market seg-
ment), i. The value of such a vacancy is V (i). The ﬁrm contacts a suitable job
seeker with probability ξi but cannot observe her skills at this stage. However
the ﬁrm holds a rational belief about the probability that a matched worker in
that segment has skill of type j. This coincides with the equilibrium fraction
of workers with skill j within the pool of unemployed workers participating in
the market segment i, zj|i. The ﬂow recruiting cost of posting a vacancy is cR.
Second, upon contact, the ﬁrm observes the worker’s skill, and the ﬁrm and the
worker agree on whether to create the job. As before, πj|i ∈ {0,1} denotes the
decision of the ﬁrm. When the job is created, the ﬁrm has to pay a ﬁxed cost
of ck units associated with the training of the worker and/or administrative
regulations. 9
Third, the ﬁrm starts operating and earns a ﬂow y(j,i). The value of the job
match for the ﬁrm is J(j,i). When the job is terminated, the ﬁrm will seek
to open a new vacancy type i of the highest value. The ﬁrm also discounts
future values at the constant interest rate r. Formally, the Bellman equation
for J(j,i) is
rJ(j,i) = y(j,i) + (λ + ρ)
"
max
i0∈{e,ne}
V (i
0) − J(j,i)
#
, (6)
9 Cuadras-Morat´ o and Mateos-Planas (2006) assume ck = 0.
8and for the value of a vacancy V (i),
rV (i) = − cR + ξi
X
j=s,ns
zj|iπj|i[J(j,i) − V (i) − ck] (7a)
πj|i =

 
 
0 J(j,i) − V (i) − ck ≤ 0
1 J(j,i) − V (i) − ck > 0
(7b)
2.3 Technology
The total ﬂow of output to a match satisﬁes
ηj = w(j,i) + y(j,i). (8)
where ηj denotes the productivity of a worker with skill j. It is assumed that
ηs > ηns.
The matching technology is speciﬁed as a homogenous-of-degree-one function:
m(v,u) = m0v
1−θu
θ, θ ∈ [0,1],
This function gives the number of matches per period in segment i, mi =
m(vi,ui), where vi is the mass of vacant ﬁrms and ui is the number of unem-
ployed workers in this segment, and m0 > 0 characterizes the eﬃciency of the
matching process. Therefore the probabilities of contact for ﬁrms and workers
are
ξi =mi/vi = ξ(vi/ui) = m0
vi
ui
−θ
νi =mi/ui = ν(vi/ui) = m0
vi
ui
1−θ
(9)
so ξ0(.) < 0 and ν0(.) > 0.
2.4 Bargaining, free-entry, and skills of the unemployed
The ﬁrm and the worker bargain at each instant over the surplus of the match
to determine the wage. The solution to the corresponding generalized Nash
bargaining problem is
w(j,i) = argmax{β logSW(j,i) + (1 − β)logSF(j,i)},
where SW(j,i) ≡ W(j,i) − U(j,i) and SF(j,i) ≡ J(j,i) − V (i) represent the
match surplus to the worker and the ﬁrm respectively, and β represents the
9workers’ bargaining power. Using (2)-(4) and (6)-(7), the necessary ﬁrst-order
condition for this problem is:
1 − β
β(1 − b1)
(W(j,i) − U(j,i)) = J(j,i) − V (i) (10)
Free-entry in vacancies leads to the exhaustion of pure rents from vacancy
creation in both segments:
V (i) = 0 (11)
The ﬁrms in a segment i take as given the skill composition of the unem-
ployed workers from which matches are drawn, zj|i. This depends of the skill-
composition of the labour force in this segment, pj|i, and the matching and
hiring rates, νi and πj|i. Supposing that workers accept the job oﬀers made
by ﬁrms, then in a steady-state the equalization of the ﬂows in and out of
employment will lead to the following expression:
zs|i = 1 − zns|i = ps|i
 
νiπs|i + λ + ρ
νiπns|i + λ + ρ
(1 − ps|i) + ps|i
!−1
(12)
3 Equilibrium
An equilibrium is a situation consistent with (1)-(11) above and, then, also (12)
since workers always accept a job oﬀer. 10 A more formal deﬁnition follows.
Deﬁnition. Consider as given λ, β, r, ρ, θ, µ(j,i), m0, ck, ηs, ηns, α, b0, b1,
and cR. An equilibrium consists of values vi/ui, w(j,i), πj|i, and pj|i, and φj,
for i = e,ne and j = s,ns such that:
(i) Given pj|i, the values vi/ui, w(j,i) and πj|i satisfy (3),(4),(6),(7), (9)-(12).
(ii) Given vi/ui, w(j,i), and πj|i for i = e,ne, the conditions in (5) determine
φj for j = s,ns, with the value functions in (5) satisfying (3),(4),(6),(7),
(8)-(12).
(iii) The values ps|i are determined from φj according to (1).
(iv) ps|e > ps|ne.
In point (i) the equilibrium can be analysed ﬁrst for the case that the skill
composition of the labour force in the two segments ps|i’s are given. Conditions
(ii)−(iii) concern the determination of this composition ps|i through the career
choices φj’s. The last point (iv) is a restriction on the type of outcomes that are
10 The decision of a worker whether to accept an oﬀer in (4) is dominated by the
hiring decision of the ﬁrm πj|i in (7b) since (10) must hold.
10of interest, and will be discussed further in section 3.2 below. Before dealing
with the interactions between career choices and the labour market outcomes,
this section begins with the case that the career decisions are exogenous.
3.1 Exogenous career choices
This section studies ﬁrst the equilibrium in each segment when the career
choices φj’s are exogenous (i.e., only point (i) of the deﬁnition needs to be
satisﬁed), which implies that the distribution of skills (i.e., the pj|i’s) is given
too. Then an equilibrium determines the variables vi/ui (or, by (9), νi), w(j,i),
and πj|i for i = e,ne and j = s,ns. They can be characterized by a couple of
relationships.
v/u
wages
JC(s,i|weq(ns,i))
JC(ns,i|weq(s,i))
JD(s,i)
JD(ns,i)
weq(ns,i)
weq(s,i)
(v/u)eq
Figure 1. Equilibrium in segment i.
The ﬁrst type of relation comes from the bargaining condition (10). This is
the job-destruction curve which gives the wage as a function of the worker’s
skill, the segment’s tightness and the ﬁrm’s hiring decisions:
w(j,i) =
(ηj − b0 − b1ηj)
1 − b1
βν(vi/ui)πj|i + β(r + ρ + λ)
βν(vi/ui)πj|i + (r + ρ + λ)
+
b0
1 − b1
(13)
Expression (13) traces out a positive relation between the wage and the equilib-
rium market tightness – provided that the minimal condition ηj(1−b1)−b0 > 0
holds. The interpretation is that a higher probability of meeting a vacancy for
11the worker, νi, means that the outside option of a job is also higher. Hence
the wage has to be also higher to keep the worker into the job. Since νi de-
pends positively of market tightness, the positive relation between vi/ui and
w(j,i) follows. In Figure 1, the two upward-sloping curves denoted JD(s,i)
and JD(ns,i) represent the two job-destruction relations described by (13),
one for each skill level j.
The other type of relation comes from the free-entry condition (11):
ξ(vi/ui)
X
j=s,ns
zj|iπj|i
"
1
r + λ + ρ
(ηj − w(j,i)) − ck
#
− cR = 0 (14a)
πj|i =

 
 
0
h
1
r+λ+ρ (ηj − w(j,i)) − ck
i
< 0
1 otherwise
(14b)
where the ﬁrm’s net proﬁt is in brackets and, using (12) with (9),
zs|i = 1 − zns|i = ps|i
 
ν(vi/ui)πs|i + λ + ρ
ν(vi/ui)πns|i + λ + ρ
(1 − ps|i) + ps|i
!−1
(14c)
This expression is associated with the idea of job creation. A higher probability
of contacting a worker, ξi, increases the expected proﬁts for the ﬁrm. Free-
entry would drive the wages upwards so as to restore the zero value of creating
vacancies. Since ξi depends negatively on market tightness, a negative relation
between vi/ui and wages follows for each j = s,ns. In Figure 1, the two
downward-sloping curves denoted JC are associated with the job-creation
relation implied by (14), one for each skill level. More speciﬁcally, for a given
tightness vi/ui, the corresponding point on JC(s,i | weq(ns,i)) represents
the skilled wage that satisﬁes (14) for the given equilibrium non-skilled wage
weq(ns,i). Points on the other curve JC(ns,i | weq(s,i)) represent the non-
skilled wage consistent with (14) given the equilibrium skilled wage weq(s,i).
Note that any of the two curves exists only as long as the ﬁrms in the segment
are willing to hire the worker of the corresponding skill level j (i.e., πj|i = 1)
and that if instead πj|i = 0 then JC(j,i) cannot be drawn.
For each segment i, the equilibrium can then be expressed as a market tight-
ness vi/ui and a pair of wages w(s,i) and w(ns,i) that satisfy (13) and (14).
Graphically, in Figure 1 the equilibrium is characterized by the single market
tightness and the two wages where the pairs of curves JC and JD associ-
ated with each skill level intersect, and the wages so determined match the
equilibrium values underlying the two JC curves. 11
11 If for example the ns workers are not hired and πns|i = 0, then the equilibrium
if fully characterized by the intersection between JD(s,i) and JC(s,i) where the
latter does not depend on w(ns,i). This notional wage w(ns,i) is still given by the
12This representation of the equilibrium as the solution to the system (13)-(14)
will prove useful to articulate the discussion of comparative statics later on.
However, in order to establish fundamental results on existence, multiplicity,
and properties of the equilibria a more manageable version will prove useful.
It can be derived by writing (13) as
ηj − w(j,i) =
(r + ρ + λ)(1 − β)[(1 − b1)ηj − b0]
(1 − b1)(r + ρ + λ + βν(vi/ui)πj|i)
(15)
which can be used to replace the terms ηj − w(j,i) in (14). This delivers
a single equation in market tightness whose solution is an equilibrium. The
equilibrium in segment i can then be expressed as a market tightness vi/ui
that satisﬁes (14) with (15). It must therefore be consistent with the ﬁrm’s
hiring policy πj|i in (14b) which characterizes the choice of the ﬁrm whether
to create the job when contacting an unemployed worker with skill j. There
is the possibility that a match with a particular skill j is not proﬁtable and
the job is not created, but observe that (14a) requires that at least for one
j the job is created. Changes in career decision enter this condition through
changes in the composition of the labour force ps|i and thus the probabilities
that, say, an unemployed worker is skilled in the educated segment, zs|e, in
(14c). Since the educated and the non-educated sectors are both operative,
any ﬁrm must be willing to hire at least the skilled workers so that one can set
πs|e = πs|ne = 1. In principle, the non-skilled workers may be hired in either
sector, both sectors or none sector.
In order to make this characterization more precise Figure 2 is introduced.
It represents the left-hand side of (14a) as a decreasing function of vi/ui, on
account of (14b)-(14c) and (15). Thus an equilibrium must be unique. Also
existence requires that the curve lies above the horizontal zero line for low
values of the market tightness. Formally, given the limiting properties of the
function ξ(.), a necessary condition for existence is that ﬁrms be willing to
hire at least skilled workers when tightness is very low.
The left-hand side of (14a) has a discontinuity at the value (vi/ui)∗ of market
tightness where, according to (14b), πns|i shifts from 1 to 0 or, in other words,
the value at which it is no longer proﬁtable for ﬁrms in segment i to hire
non-skilled workers. At this point, the probability of meeting a skilled worker
among the pool of unemployed, zs|i in (14c), drops because all the non-skilled
workers in this segment become unemployed. An equilibrium may not exist
due to this discontinuity. When there is a zero of the LHS of (14a) to the right
of (vi/ui)∗, non-skilled workers are not hired, otherwise both skill types are
hired. Figure 2 has been drawn for the latter case so πns|i = 1. 12
point on JD(ns,i).
12 If all the labour force are non-skilled workers, there is no issue of discontinuity.
For a very similar model, Cuadras-Morat´ o and Mateos-Planas (2006) establishes
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v/u*
π (ns|i)=1
LHS of Eq.(14a)
Figure 2. Equilibrium in segment i.
3.2 Endogenous career choices
The skill composition ps|i has been taken as given so far. In equilibrium, it
must be consistent with points (ii) − (iv) of the deﬁnition of equilibrium.
That is to say, it must be true that there is a more skilled labour force in the
educated segment ps|e > ps|ne, and that the pj|i’s are determined by the career
decisions of workers according to (1) and (5), with the equilibrium values of
searching in alternative segments satisfying
(r + ρ)U(j,i) = b(w(j,i)) + ν(vi/ui)πj|i
w(j,i) − b(w(j,i))
r + ρ + λ + ν(vi/ui)πj|i
, (16)
where the equality follows from (3) and (4).
The last point iv implies that φs = 1 and that the key interesting career de-
cision is φns. The analysis will be restricted to equilibrium situations where
both the educated and the non-educated labour-market segments are opera-
tive, and where the proportion of skilled workers is higher among the labour
force that participates in the educated segment (i.e., ps|e > ps|ne). The latter is
intuitive and convenient since it restricts the type of career choices that may
arise in equilibrium. In eﬀect, the skilled workers that are educated must de-
cide to participate in the educated segment, or φs = 1. Otherwise, existence of
an active educated segment would require the non-skilled educated workers to
this characterisation more formally.
14be the only participants in the educated segment. But then non-skilled agents
would be most numerous in the educated segment, which is inconsistent with
the required condition on the pj|i’s. That φs = 1 will in turn imply, by (5) with
(16) and (13), that in equilibrium market tightness is higher in the educated
segment.
Proposition 1.In an equilibrium workers who are educated and skilled must
participate in the educated segment, or φs = 1, and market tightness is
higher in that segment, or ve/ue > vne/une.
Thus variation in labour-force participation (or career) will occur only through
the choice by the educated non-skilled workers, φns. An unsurprising yet
important result is that educated non-skilled workers will turn to the non-
educated segments when they see no chance of employment in the educated
segment. 13 The reverse implication that educated individuals will leave the
educated segment only if ﬁrms there do not hire them is also true. Proposition
2 states this more precisely.
Proposition 2.Suppose that πns|ne = 1. Then πns|e = 0 if and only if
φns = 0.
Proof: If πj|i = 1 then (7b) and (10) imply that W(j,i) − U(j,i) > 0. Using this
in (3) and (4) shows that if πj|i = 1 then
(r + ρ)U(j,i) = b(w(j,i)) +
νiπj|i
νiπj|i + λ + r + ρ
(w(j,i) − b(w(j,i))),
with w(j,i) − b(w(j,i)) > 0. On the other hand, if πj|i = 0 then, by (4), (r +
ρ)U(j,i) = b(w(j,i)).
First one has to prove that πns|ne = 1 and πns|e = 0 imply φns = 0. The result
requires, from (5), U(ns,e) < U(ns,ne). Given the preceding discussion, it suﬃces
to prove that w(ns,ne) > w(ns,e), which follows by using (13).
Second one has to prove the reverse that πns|ne = 1 and φns = 0 imply πns|e = 0.
One can proceed by contradiction by assuming πns|e = 1. Use the discussion
opening this proof to write the expressions for U(ns,e) and U(ns,ne). Using the
Proposition 1 that νe > νne and, from (13), that w(ns,e) > w(ne,ne), it follows
that U(ns,e) > U(ns,ne). From (5) this is a contradiction with the assumption
that φns = 0. Q.E.D.
When, like under the conditions of Proposition 2, φns = 0 then there are
educated workers that perform jobs that do not require a qualiﬁcation. This
is a form of the phenomenon known as overeducation.
13 From (16) the sign of the diﬀerence between U(ns,e) − U(ns,ne) in (5) depends
on the sign of w(ns,e) − w(ns,ne) which, by (13), is negative .
15In general, one has to account for the possibility that two equilibria exist,
one with φns = 0 and the other with φns = 1. In the case that φns = 1
all educated workers, including those unskilled, participate in the educated
segment. Graphically, in Figure 2 the equilibrium tightness in the educated
segment ve/ue is located to the left of the threshold (ve/ue)∗ and πns|e = 1. If
there exists another equilibrium with φns = 0, it will have overeducation and
a skill composition where, relative to the equilibrium with φns = 1, the skill
of the labour force improves in the educated segment and worsens in the non-
educated segment (see (1)). Graphically, in Figure 2 the equilibrium tightness
in the educated segment ve/ue is located to the right of the threshold (ve/ue)∗.
The large tightness in the educated segment conﬁrms the ﬁrm’s decision to
turn down non-skilled workers, πns|e = 0 (see (14b) with (15)), and thus the
career choice by non-skilled workers to leave the educated segment, φns = 0
(see Proposition 2).
4 Comparative statics
For the purpose of this paper it will be important to identify the theoretical
eﬀects of exogenous factors on the endogenous variables of the model. This
section discusses the consequences of a skill biased change in technology and
the possible ensuing shifts in the skill composition of the labour force. A
skill-biased shock widens the productivity gap between skilled and unskilled
workers, so it will be represented as a rise in the skilled productivity ηs and a
reduction in non-skilled productivity ηns of equal size.
It will be supposed that the economy is initially in a steady-state equilibrium
where unskilled yet educated workers do in eﬀect participate in the educated
segment, or φns = 1, and consequently by Proposition 2 these workers can
ﬁnd employment in the educated segment, or πns|e = 1. In other words, there
is no overeducation since all educated workers are employed in the educated
segment. Graphically, the equilibrium wage structure w(j,i) and market tight-
ness vi/ui in each segment are determined as in Figures 1 and 2. As for the
joint distribution of skills and education in the labor force µ(j,i), it will be as-
sumed that the majority of educated agents are skilled and that the majority
of non-educated workers are non-skilled. In the initial economy this means, by
(1) and on account that φns = 1, that the composition of skills of the labor
force in each segment satisﬁes that ps|e > 0.5 and ps|ne < 0.5.
The observable variables that are the object of this paper are the unem-
ployment rates for educated and non-educated workers respectively, residual
inequality within each education group, and the wage premium. These can
be calculated by aggregating appropriately the equilibrium outcomes of the
model. Note that in the initial economy, the fact that there is no overeduca-
16tion means that outcomes within a speciﬁc education group coincide with the
outcomes within the corresponding segment. For a start, it is supposed that
the SBTC does not change this situation and thus φns remains 1 after the
shock. Then the possible response of the career choice φns will be considered.
4.1 Skill-biased change without overeducation
Consider ﬁrst the consequences of the SBTC in the educated segment. From
(14) with (13) it is apparent that, given that πs|e = πns|e = 1 in the initial
equilibrium, the impact of the larger ηs and the lower ηns on vacancy prof-
itability depends on the skill composition of the pool of unemployed searchers
in this segment zs|e. Note that according to (14c), in the initial economy this
coincides with the skill composition of the labor force in this segment ps|e,
which has been assumed to exceed 0.5. With these conditions, it is clear that
the SBTC increases the value of vacancy creation in the educated segment as
represented in the left-hand side of (14) with (15) when i = e. Therefore the
market tightness ve/ue increases as the curve in Figure 2 shifts upwards. This
will reduce the unemployment rate of educated workers. Wages as given in
(13) increase for skilled jobs w(s,e) but can go either way for unskilled jobs
w(ns,e). Graphically, the improvement in average productivity shifts upwards
the job-creation curve JC for both skilled and non-skilled workers, but the
skill-speciﬁc changes in productivity shift the job-destruction curves JD up-
wards for the skilled and downwards for the non skilled. As the gap between
these two wage rates widens there is a rise in (residual) wage inequality within
the group of educated workers.
Turning now to the non-educated segment, the lower ηns implies a lower prof-
itability of vacancy creation in this segment. This follows from the fact that,
in contrast with the educated segment, this is a skill-scarce segment in that
zs|ne = ps|ne < 0.5. Graphically, the curve in Figure 2 shifts downwards which
causes tightness in this segment vne/une to fall. The inevitable consequence
is a rise in the unemployment rate of the non-educated workers. The wages
in unskilled jobs w(ns,ne) fall but the wage in skilled jobs w(s,ne) can go
either way. Graphically, the loss in average productivity shifts downward the
job-creation curve JC for both skilled and non-skilled workers, but the skill-
speciﬁc changes in productivity shift the job-destruction curves JD upwards
for the skilled and downwards for the non skilled. Like in the educated seg-
ment, as the gap between these two wage rates widens, there is a rise in residual
wage inequality within the group of non-educated workers too.
As for wage diﬀerences across groups, the direct impact of the SBTC on rela-
tive productivity will tend to increase the average wage of the skill-abundant
educated group relative to the skill-scarce non-educated group. The wage pre-
17mium must increase as a consequence. Note that this direct eﬀect will be
reinforced by the induced shifts in tightness and unemployment in the two
segments.
In sum, a SBTC that increases wage inequality, both within and across groups,
produces an increase in unemployment among non-educated workers but a fall
in unemployment within the educated group. The latter is at odds with the
generalized rise in unemployment in the US over the period 1970-1990.
4.2 Skill-biased change and overeducation
A skill-biased technical change can be large enough to change the initial policy
of ﬁrms in the educated segment to hire non-skilled workers, πns|e = 1. The
relative reduction in the productivity of non-skilled workers ηns can, according
to (14b) with (15), render them unproﬁtable in this segment and lead ﬁrms in
this segment to refuse ﬁlling vacancies with such type of workers, or πns|e = 0.
Proposition 2 then implies that unskilled workers will turn to the non-educated
segment, or φns = 0, and overeducation arises. Note that, since it has to be
assumed that ηns − b(ηns) > 0 for the non-educated ﬁrms to hire non-skilled
workers, overeducation can only happen if the cost of creating a job ck is
positive.
In these circumstances, it is instructive to break down the consequences of a
SBTC into a direct eﬀect – similar to the one operating without overeducation
and an unchanged πns|e = 1 – and an indirect eﬀect which operates through the
induced shifts in the skill composition of the labor force in the two segments.
Consider ﬁrst the direct eﬀect of the SBTC. In the educated segment, the curve
in Figure 2, summarizing the equilibrium (14) and (15), shifts up far enough to
determine and equilibrium to the right of the discontinuity which is the region
where πns|e = 0. Note also that the threshold (ve/ue)∗ has shifted to the
left. The rise in tightness also seen without overeducation follows. In terms of
Figure 1, like in the case without overeducation, the JC curves move upwards,
and the JD curves move up and down for the skilled and unskilled matches
respectively, so a wider wage dispersion within the educated segment follows.
Note, however, that since πns|e = 0 the JC curve for the non-skilled workers in
Figure 1 ceases to exist. 14 In the non-educated segment, the direct eﬀect of
the SBTC follows along the same lines as in the case without overeducation.
The fall in average productivity shifts downwards the curve in Figure 2 leading
to a lower market tightness vne/une. 15 The dispersion of wages paid in this
14 Still the JD curve shifts downwards and determines the notional wage for the
non-skilled workers w(ns,e).
15 This segment will always remain in the region to the left of the threshold
18segment also widens following the shifts in the JC and JD curves in Figure 1
which parallel those in the case without overeducation.
Besides these direct eﬀects, the rise in overeducation causes indirect eﬀects
operating through the associated shifts in the composition of the labour force
in the two segments, ps|e and ps|ne. In eﬀect, that φns goes from 1 to 0 means
that the subset of educated workers who are non-skilled quit the educated
segment and move into the non-educated segment. As it is clear from (1),
the skill composition of labour then improves in the educated segment but
worsens in the non-educated segment. The proﬁtability of vacancy creation
further increases in the educated segment and declines in the non-educated
segment. This reinforces the shifts of the corresponding curves in Figure 2 and
the job-creation curves JC in Figure 1 in the two segments and, therefore, the
changes in the corresponding equilibrium market tightness and wages.
In sum, a SBTC brings about a widening gap between skilled and non-skilled
wages in the two segments, a rise in tightness in the educated segment, and a
fall in the non-educated segment. Following up the preceding discussion, this
continues to be true if the SBTC also causes overeducation which, in fact, tends
to reinforce those responses. As for aggregate measures of unemployment and
earnings by education group, the emergence of overeducation might be more
signiﬁcant since it leads to the existence of a fraction of the educated labor
force whose wages and unemployment will come to be determined within the
high-unemployment (and low-wage) segment of non-educated jobs. It is thus
that, when accompanied by overeducation, a SBTC might account for the rise
in the educated unemployment rate characteristic of the US experience over
the period 1970-1990. Remember from section 4.1 that, absent overeducation,
a SBTC is bound to fail on that front.
5 Calibration
One model’s period is assumed to correspond to one quarter. The parameters
to be determined are: b1, r, ρ, λ, θ, β, ηs, ηns, b0, cR, m0, ck, and the skill
distribution µ(j,i). 16 Six of these parameters can be set directly. The choice
of b1 is based on OECD (1997), λ on Stewart (2002), r on Cooley and Prescott
(1995). A life-expectancy in the labor market of 45 years implies ρ = 1/(45×
4). The matching elasticity θ is set following the estimate in Blanchard and
Diamond (1990). The choice of m0 is a normalization. The start-up cost ck is
chosen small enough so that in 1970 there is a regime with low overeducation
or φns = 1 on account of the evidence in Pryor and Schaﬀer (1997) that 1970
(vne/une)∗ and thus πns|ne = 1.
16 Much of this calibration will follow CMMP.
19precedes the rise in overeducation.
To determine the remaining parameters, outcomes are restricted to be consis-
tent with targets for the key endogenous variables corresponding to the year
1970. There are two blocks to this task. One block of the calibration procedure
consists of matching the wage premium, the unemployment rates of educated
and non-educated workers, and the value of the recruiting cost as a proportion
of wage income by choice of the four parameters ηs, b0, β, and cR. It is assumed
that ηs+ηns = 3, and changes in ηs can be regarded as skill-biased changes in
technology. The targets for the wage premium and unemployment are taken
from the 1970 data of Table 1. The hiring cost is based on Hamermesh (1993).
Table 2. Calibration
parameter value target to match source
b1 0.2 UI replacement 20% OECD (1997)
r 0.013 annual interest 5% Cooley et al. (1995)
ρ 0.0055 working life 45 years
λ 0.06 annual separation rate 25% Stewart (2002)
θ 0.5 matching elast. 0.5 Blanchard et al. (1990)
m0 1 normalize to unity
ck 0.05 low overeduc. φns = 1 Pryor et al. (1997)
µ(ns,e) 0.085 college partic. 25% US Census Bureau (1995)
µ(s,e) 0.165 residual ineq. diﬀ. 0.06 Gould (2002)
µ(s,ne) 0.035
µ(ns,ne) 0.715 normalize mass 1
ηs = 3 − ηns 1.915 wage premium 1.44 Murphy et al. (1992)
b0 0.770 unemp. educ. 1.1% US Census Bureau (1995)
β 0.140 unemp. non-educ. 2.4% US Census Bureau (1995)
cR 0.10 recruiting costs 2% Hamermesh (1993)
In the other block, the parameters µ(j,i)’s are calibrated to match the tar-
gets of educational attainment and measures of inequality within deﬁned oc-
cupational categories that can be associated with the two segments in the
model. The education target can be written in terms of these parameters as
educ = µ(s,e)+µ(ns,e). Residual variances depend on the implied ps|i’s which
can be written ps|e = µ(s,e)/educ and ps|ne = µ(s,ne)/(1−educ). These rela-
tions, along with the normalization
P
i,j µ(j,i) = 1, pin down the distribution
parameters. The target for education is the 1970 ﬁgure for college participa-
tion of the male labor force aged 25 (see US Census Bureau, 1995, Table 629).
Concerning inequality within job categories, Gould (2002, Fig. 1b) reports
the variance of log-wage residuals within three diﬀerent occupation groups.
20The target to match will be the 0.06 diﬀerential residual variance of educated
over non-educated jobs in 1970. 17 The choice made here implies that the skill
composition of the two segments is given by ps|e = 0.660 and ps|ne = 0.0467.
Table 2 displays the benchmark calibration and summarizes the procedure.
All targets set out are matched exactly, with the educated and non-educated
residual variances being 0.07 and 0.01.
6 Numerical exercises
This section studies the response of unemployment rates for educated and
non-educated workers, residual inequality within each education group, and
the wage premium to shifts in various exogenous factors within the model. 18
The factors considered will include a skill-biased change in technology, a shock
to the level of employment frictions, and changes in the distribution of skills
in the labor force. This section proceeds in several parts. In the ﬁrst part
the purpose is to explain the 1970-1990 changes in the U.S. labor market
reported in Table 1. The primary explanatory factor considered will be a skill-
biased change in technology, or SBTC. An additional shock to the level of
employment frictions will also be considered. In the second, the quantitative
model will be used to interpret the 1970-1980 developments where changes in
the distribution of the labor force will play a role.
6.1 The role of a SBTC in the period 1970-1990
The skill-biased shock can be represented by a rise in the productivity of the
skilled workers, ηs, and a corresponding decline in the productivity of the non-
skilled workers, ηns = 3−ηs. 19 An employment shock can be represented by a
reduction in m0. This section reports the eﬀect of this type of shock on the cal-
ibrated benchmark economy. The main results of the experiments conducted
are contained in Table 3. 20 Each row shows ﬁrst the value of the parame-
ters ηs and m0, and the endogenous career choice φns which characterizes the
17 In the model one can calculate the variance within a segment i as (logw(s,i) −
logw(ns,i))2ps|i(1 − ps|i) where ps|i is the share of skilled in the segment.
18 To trace the response of these variables it is necessary ﬁrst to measure them more
precisely in terms of the variables of the model. This is done in the Appendix.
19 Equivalently, one might postulate a widening gap with positive growth in both
productivities while the economy-wide parameters increase at an average rate that
must exceed the rise in non-skilled productivity.
20 Alternatively and to the same eﬀect, this type of shock could be represented by
an increase in the separation rate λ. See Cuadras-Morat´ o and Mateos-Planas (2006)
for a discussion of this point.
21presence or absence of overeducation. The rest of entries on each row contain
the key observable variables: the wage premium wp, the unemployment rate
of the educated une, the unemployment rate of the non-educated unne, and
the residual inequality for the educated, rese, and the non-educated, resne.
The ﬁrst row shows the ﬁgures corresponding to the benchmark 1970 equilib-
rium. The second row reproduces the 1990 data on the observable variables
in order to facilitate the comparison with the implications of the numerical
experiments.
Table 3. Skill biased technical change and the 1970-1990 period
parameters overeducation observable variables
ηs m0 φns wp une unne rese resne
(1) 1.915 1.000 1 1.440 0.011 0.024 0.065 0.011
(2) 1.580 0.021 0.053
(3) 1.980 1.000 1 1.533 0.011 0.032 0.089 0.015
(4) 0 1.545 0.017 0.033 0.092 0.014
(5) 1.990 1.000 0 1.561 0.018 0.035 0.096 0.015
(6) 2.010 1.000 0 1.594 0.020 0.041 0.104 0.015
(7) 2.010 0.800 0 1.591 0.024 0.051 0.101 0.014
The ﬁrst experiment focuses on the skill-biased shock only. Rows 3 to 6 show
the changes as ηs is increased. The third row corresponds to an equilibrium
where, like in the initial benchmark, there is no overeducation. The wage
premium, the measures of residual inequality, and the unemployment rate
for the non-educated have increased. However, the unemployment rate of the
educated labor force fails to increase. These conclusions conform the analysis
presented above in section 4.1. Now for the same parameters, this economy
has another equilibrium with overeducation and the fourth row shows the
outcomes associated with it. The key feature of this equilibrium is the increase
in the educated unemployment rate which follows from overeducation in the
way discussed in section 4.2 above. The comparison of the third and fourth
rows reveals that the increase in overeducation may on its own account for an
increase in the educated unemployment rate as a consequence of a SBTC.
The ﬁfth and sixth rows display the outcomes associated with larger SBTC’s.
The equilibrium is unique and features overeducation in that φns = 0. Speciﬁ-
cally, the ηs in the sixth row has been chosen to nearly match the observed wage
premium in 1990. We observe that, against the observed 1970-1990 changes,
the SBTC so measured is able to produce nearly all of the rise in the educated
unemployment rate and about sixty per cent of the rise in the non-educated
unemployment rate, as well as a sizeable upward shifts in residual inequality
within the two education groups. Thus the theory advanced early that a SBTC
22can account for the 1970-1990 changes in all the variables also fares well under
the rigour of a quantitative exercise.
Although the SBTC accounts for much of the observed changes over the pe-
riod 1970-1990, it still leaves unexplained a sizeable portion of the rise in the
non-educated unemployment rate. This suggests some additional exogenous
factor must have been at work. For example, one could think of an increase
in labour market frictions that can be characterized by a lower eﬃciency of
the matching process. The seventh row of Table 3 considers a reduction of the
matching parameter m0 alongside the SBTC characterized by an increase in
ηs −ηns. The fall in m0 is tuned to nearly match the rise in non-educated un-
employment. Although now the educated unemployment rate exceeds the 1990
observation, the combined eﬀect of a SBTC and a mismatch shock provides a
fairly complete account of the 1970-1990 facts.
6.2 The 1970-1980 period and the skill distribution
The wage premium declined markedly between 1970 and 1980 – from the
initial 1.44 in Table 1 down to 1.37 – before launching on the subsequent
sharper increases. How can this model reconcile this observation with the
presence of SBTC driving up unemployment rates? It will be shown that a
shift in the distribution of skills could account for this early decline. More
speciﬁcally, the substantial increase in college participation or the entry of the
baby boom generation into the labor force might have led to a deterioration
of the average quality of the college workers, µ(s,e) up to, roughly, 1980. The
evidence of declining GRE scores clearly supports this view. Figure 3 shows
that the growth in college participation was particularly rapid in the period
to the early 80’s. Figure 3 also displays average GRE scores of verbal and
numerical competence for college graduates, and shows a clear decline during
the 70’s. This trend is reversed past 1980 as, it seems plausible to conjecture,
the education system adjusts to bring the skill composition µ(s,e) close to its
initial ’natural’ level by 1990.
This section explores the implications of these developments within the model.
Table 4 shows the results of some calculations. Each row corresponds to a spe-
ciﬁc setting for the exogenous parameters associated with the SBTC, ηs, and
the skills distribution, µ(s,e). In this experiments, a change in µ(s,e) is always
accompanied by an adjustment of µ(ns,e) so that µ(s,e) + µ(ns,e) remains
constant. The ﬁrst row of Table 4 reproduces the calibrated 1970 benchmark.
The other rows from 2 to 6 demonstrate that, when accompanied with a lower
µ(s,e), the SBTC can produce general rises in the two unemployment rates,
and the two measures of residual inequality, at the same time as the wage
premium declines. The SBTC still must be large enough to produce a switch
23in career choice φns towards overeducation which accounts for most of the
increase in the educated unemployment rate. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁfth and sixth
rows in Table 4 report outcomes which nearly match the observed 1.37 wage
premium in 1980.
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Figure 3. Educational attainment 1970-2002 as the percentage of male civilian
force 25 to 64 years of age with a high school diploma who are college graduates.
Source: Women in the Labor Force: A Databook, US Bureau of Labor Statistics,
2004. Graduate Record Examination (GRE) average scores of quantitative and
verbal competence, 1965-1995. Source: Digest of education statistics, tables and
ﬁgures 1996, National Center for Education Statistics (http://nces.ed.gov).
Table 4. SBTC, skills distribution, and the 1970-1980 period
parameters overeducation observable variables
ηs µ(s,e) φns wp une unne rese resne
(1) 1.915 0.165 1 1.440 0.011 0.024 0.065 0.011
(2) 1.990 0.130 0 1.436 0.022 0.036 0.107 0.015
(3) 1.990 0.120 0 1.401 0.023 0.036 0.108 0.015
(4) 2.000 0.120 0 1.413 0.024 0.038 0.112 0.015
(5) 1.990 0.110 0 1.365 0.024 0.036 0.106 0.015
(6) 2.000 0.110 0 1.376 0.025 0.038 0.111 0.015
Table 5 reports experiments where, in addition to the SBTC and the change in
the distribution of skills, there is a fall in the eﬃciency of matching. The ﬁrst
row corresponds again to the calibrated benchmark. The other entries consider
combinations of ηs, µ(s,e) and m0 that approximately match the 1980 wage
24premium of 1.37. The second row shows that without SBTC, a lower matching
eﬃciency and skill of the educated cannot eﬀect the increase in residual in-
equality among the non-educated, and overeducation cannot arise. The other
variables move in the right direction although by substantially smaller amounts
than in the case with SBTC and without the mismatch shock seen above in
rows 5 and 6 of Table 4. It is only when a SBTC is added that there is a rise
in residual inequality for the non-educated and, overall, changes are quantita-
tively more in line with observations. This is particularly true when, as it is
the case in the third row, the SBTC is not big enough to cause overeducation.
If there is overeducation instead the model implies too big an increase in the
educated unemployment rate.
Table 5. SBTC, skills, and mismatch over 1970-1980
parameters overeduc observable variables
ηs µ(s,e) m0 φns wp une unne rese resne
(1) 1.915 0.165 1.00 1 1.440 0.011 0.024 0.065 0.011
(2) 1.915 0.140 0.80 1 1.364 0.015 0.031 0.069 0.011
(3) 1.980 0.120 0.80 1 1.370 0.016 0.040 0.094 0.014
(4) 1.990 0.110 0.80 1 1.344 0.017 0.042 0.096 0.014
(5) 0 1.364 0.030 0.045 0.105 0.014
(6) 2.000 0.110 0.80 1 1.353 0.017 0.045 0.101 0.014
(7) 0 1.375 0.032 0.048 0.109 0.014
In sum, a deterioration of the skills in the educated labor force is necessary
to account for the 1970-1980 drop in the wage premium. A SBTC is also
needed to account for residual inequality in this period. If the SBTC causes
overeducation, then the addition of an extra shock in the form of a reduction in
matching eﬃciency overestimates the rise in educated unemployment. With a
large enough decline in matching eﬃciency, the model delivers unemployment
outcomes comparable with the data for 1970-1980 only if the SBTC does not
cause overeducation to rise. Since the direct evidence of overeducation is quite
compelling, this analysis suggests that the SBTC can account for most of the
changes in unemployment over the 1970-1980 subperiod.
7 Conclusion
This paper extends the standard search-matching model by introducing the
possibility of overeducation in a segmented labor market where education
and skill are not equivalent attributes of a worker. Equilibrium properties
of the model are characterized. The model is used to study the response of
25unemployment and wage inequality to a skill-biased change.
The SBTC leads to increases in the wage premium, in residual inequality,
and in the unemployment rates of both educated and non-educated workers.
The endogenous increase in overeducation plays an essential part as it ex-
plains the consequences of the shock for the unemployment rate of educated
workers. With overeducation, there are educated workers participating in the
high-unemployment segment of jobs that do not require a degree. Overedu-
cation occurs among the educated workers who have a low ability since, in
the presence of a positive startup cost, the SBTC renders those workers un-
proﬁtable to ﬁrms in the educated segment. A calibrated setting is used to
study quantitatively a skill-biased change in technology as the cause of the
changes in education-speciﬁc unemployment rates and the wage premium in
the U.S. economy between 1970 and 1990. This shock alone can account for
most of the observed changes in these three variables, while being also con-
sistent with the evidence of a wider residual dispersion in wages and a higher
degree of overeducation. On the other hand, a temporary drop in the aver-
age skill quality within the educated group can reconcile the SBTC with the
falling wage premium and soaring unemployment rates in the initial period
1970-1980, without need of invoking other explanations such as a decline in
the eﬃciency of matching. This change in the skill composition can be moti-
vated by the rapid growth in the numbers of college graduates and supported
by some direct evidence from performance scores.
This paper has limitations which hint at interesting extensions. Changes in the
distribution of skills and education status in the labor force have been treated
as exogenous, but education choices could be made endogenous. The model
cannot match observed levels of residual inequality and the implications on
this dimension can only be assessed qualitatively. The analysis centers around
steady-state outcomes which may have limitations, specially in reference to
the subperiod 1970-1980.
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APPENDIX. Measurement of observable variables
The unemployment rate for the educated workers une averages the unem-
ployment probabilities in the two segments where they can participate. In a
steady-state it reads:
28une =
λ + ρ
λ + ρ + πs|eν(ve/ue)
µ(s,e)
µ(s,e) + µ(ns,e)
+
λ + ρ
λ + ρ + [φnsπs|eν(ve/ue) + (1 − φns)πns|eν(vne/une)]
µ(ns,e)
µ(s,e) + µ(ns,e)
If all the educated workers participate in the educated segment then φns = 1
and their unemployment rate is fully determined by the tightness in that
segment. Otherwise, φns = 0 and the tightness in the non-educated segment
and the relative number of non-skilled educated workers who search in the
non-educated segment will also matter. Note that since, by Proposition 2,
tightness is lower in the non-educated segment, this form of over-education
will tend to increase the overall unemployment rate of the educated labor
force.
As for the non-educated workers, only the non-educated segment is available
and the corresponding unemployment rate can be written as
unne =
λ + ρ
λ + ρ + πs|neν(vne/une)
µ(s,ne)
µ(s,ne) + µ(ns,ne)
+
λ + ρ
λ + ρ + πns|neν(vne/une)
µ(ns,ne)
µ(s,ne) + µ(ns,ne)
In the case we will always consider that πs|ne = πns|ne = 1, the non-educated
unemployment rate is fully determined by market tightness in the non-educated
segment vne/une.
Turning now to wages, the proportion of skilled among the educated employed
workers is:
se =µ(s,e)
 
1 −
λ + ρ
νe + λ + ρ
!
"
µ(s,e)
 
1 −
λ + ρ
νe + λ + ρ
!
+ µ(ns,e)
 
1 −
λ + ρ
φnsνe + (1 − φns)νe + λ + ρ
!#−1
the proportion of skilled among the educated employed workers is sne =
µ(s,ne)[µ(s,ne) + µ(ns,ne)]
−1. Denote by ˜ w(j,i) the wage earnt by a worker
of skill j and education i. Naturally, ˜ w(j,i) = w(j,i) except for ˜ w(ns,e) =
φnsw(ns,e)+(1−φns)w(ns,ne). The residual variances are resi = (log ˜ w(s,i)−
log ˜ w(ns,i))2se(1−se) for i = e,ne. The average wage of each education group
i are similarly calculated using si to weight the wages ˜ w(j,i).
29